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Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
Many people believe that when national security is threatened, federal courts
should defer to the government. Many other people believe that in times of crisis, citizens
are vulnerable to a kind of “panic” that leads to unjustified intrusions on liberty. But to
date, there is little information about what federal courts have actually done in this
domain, especially in the period after the attacks of September 11, 2001. On the basis of
a comprehensive study of relevant courts of appeals decisions in the aftermath of those
attacks, this essay offers four findings. First, the invalidation rate is about 15 percent –
low, but not so low as to suggest that federal courts have applied a broad rule of
deference to government action. Second, the division between Republican and
Democratic appointees is comparable to what is found in other areas of the law; contrary
to reasonable expectations, there is no significant “compression” of ideological divisions
in this domain. Third, and perhaps most strikingly, no panel effects are apparent here.
Unlike in the vast majority of other areas, Republican and Democratic appointees do not
appear to vote differently if they are sitting with Republican or Democratic appointees.
Finally, judicial behavior cannot be shown to have changed over time. The invalidation
rate is not higher in recent years than it was in the years immediately following the 9/11
attacks. Explanations are ventured for these various findings, with particular reference to
the absence of discernible panel effects.
I.

Introduction

In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and the executive
branch have embarked on a number of new initiatives, raising a series of fresh legal
questions.1 Many of those questions involve the relationship between national security
and some kind of individual right. Does the president have the authority to detain people
without trial?2 Do existing provisions of law allow the use of military commissions?3 Can
certain information be withheld from the public?4 When, exactly, does the government
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need a search warrant to obtain access to previously private information?5 May the
executive engage in wiretapping?6
It is easy to find two sets of recommendations for how courts should approach
such questions. On a widely held view, judicial deference is the appropriate presumption
or even rule.7 Courts lack information about the potentially serious consequences of their
judgments, and the elected branches are the best position to balance the competing
considerations. If courts should generally be reluctant to invalidate the decisions of the
executive and legislative branches,8 then their reluctance should be increased when
national security is at stake.
On a competing view, also widely held, the argument for a strong judicial role is
not at all weakened when a national security threat leads the elected branches to test the
legal boundaries.9 In “perilous times,”10 it might be thought, those branches are especially
prone to a serious form of lawlessness, and it becomes all the more important for courts
to insist on compliance with the rule of law. On this view, the system of checks and
balances, including an independent judiciary, is no less dispensable when the stakes are
high and damaging intrusions on liberty are likely.11 Defenders of this position contend
that history is on their side: Intrusions on civil liberties, popular at the time but
indefensible in retrospect, have occurred at many periods in American history.12
While the competing normative positions have been defended in great detail, we
know much less about what courts actually do. The literature on that question is sparse.13
In the post-9/11 era, it is essentially nonexistent. In this essay, I describe the results of an
effort to compile and analyze all relevant courts of appeals decisions between 9/11 and
the present. The principal findings are as follows:
1. The overall rate of invalidation is low. The government loses only 15% of the
litigated cases – a lower figure than in almost all other domains of federal law.
2. There is a significant difference between the voting patterns of Republican
appointees and those of Democratic appointees. The Republican invalidation rate
is 12%; the Democratic invalidation rate is 23%.
3. In this domain, the standard panel effects are not found. The voting patterns of
Republican appointees do not differ if they are sitting with zero, one, or two
Republican appointees. The voting patterns of Democratic appointees are not
affected by whether they are sitting with zero, one, or two Democratic appointees.
5
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This is a highly unusual finding; in the vast majority of domains of federal law,
judicial votes are greatly affected by panel composition.14
4. Invalidation rates have not changed over time. Contrary to what might well be
expected, the invalidation rate was the same in the first three years after the
attacks of 9/11 as in the following four years.
My goal here is to elaborate these results and to offer some comments and
explanations. In the process, I aim not only to explore the national security cases post9/11, but also to provide some more general remarks on the analysis of judicial voting
patterns, and about what can and cannot be learned from quantitative studies of this sort.
Part II offers a discussion of background and method; it also outlines the central findings.
Part III attempts to explain them, with particular emphasis on ideological voting and on
the largest puzzle, which is the absence of the standard panel effects. Part III explores
why judicial votes, in ideologically contested cases, are typically affected by the votes of
other judges on the panel. In the process, it offers an account of why the typical pattern is
not observed in national security cases, and of when and why we should expect to see
judges (and perhaps others) strongly affected by the views of their colleagues.
II.

Background, Method, Results

A. Ideological Differences and Panel Effects
To understand the current study, it is important to have a general sense of other
studies of judicial behavior, which have revealed three pervasive phenomena. The first is
ideological voting. In numerous areas, Republican and Democratic appointees show
significant differences in liberal voting rates.15 This finding is based on conventional
measures of ideological differences, by counting, as a “liberal vote,” a judgment in favor
of (for example) affirmative action programs, campaign finance regulation, plaintiffs in
sex discrimination cases, the right to choose abortion, or labor unions in cases involving
the National Labor Relations Act. The difference between Republican and Democratic
appointees varies by case category, but in many areas, it is significant; in a large data set,
the overall difference is 12 percent.16
Of course it would be a mistake to conclude, from this difference, that judicial
voting can be reduced to ideological predispositions. Even in the most ideologically
contested domains, most decisions are unanimous, and judges typically agree across party
14

See, e.g., Frank Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2006); James Brudney et al.,
Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern,
60 Ohio LJ 1675 (1999); Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83
Virginia Law Review 1717 (1983); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior:
A Statistical Study, Journal of Legal Analysis (forthcoming 2009); Sunstein et al., supra note.
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Id.; Landes and Posner, supra note.
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lines. Nonetheless, Republican and Democratic appointees show significant differences
in liberal voting rates. Those differences mean that the outcome of many disputes is
determined by the random assignment of judges to panels.17
The second phenomenon is ideological dampening. When they are in the minority
on three-judge panels, both Republican and Democratic appointees show significantly
more moderate voting patterns than when they are in the majority.18 Apparently both sets
of appointees are willing to offer collegial concurrences -- that is, they are willing to
concur in cases even if they would reach a different result if they were in the majority. A
simple way to demonstrate ideological dampening is to compare the voting patterns of
Republican appointees on Republican-Democratic-Democratic (RDD) panels with those
of Democratic appointees on Democratic-Republican-Republican (DRR) panels. In many
areas of the law, those patterns are essentially identical.19 Even when there is a significant
overall difference between Republican and Democratic appointees, that difference is in
that sense essentially wiped out because of panel effects.
For example, Democratic appointees vote for sex discrimination plaintiffs 42
percent of the time on RRD panels, while Republican appointees vote for such plaintiffs
44 percent of the time on RDD panels.20 Note that even on such panels, Democratic
appointees show more liberal voting rates than do Republican appointees. On RRD
panels, for example, Republican appointees vote for sex discrimination plaintiffs 37
percent of the time, well below the 42 percent rate for Democratic appointees on such
panels.21 But ideological dampening is nonetheless significant, in the sense that the
ideological tendencies of both sets of appointees are muted.
The third phenomenon is ideological amplification. When sitting on panels
consisting solely of appointees from the same political party (DDD or RRR panels),
federal judges show significantly more ideological voting patterns than when sitting on
mixed panels.22 A simple way to show this difference is to compare the overall difference
between Republican and Democratic appointees with the difference on unified panels,
with the latter counting as the “polarized difference.”23 The polarized difference is often
double or even triple the overall difference. For example, Republican appointees show a
liberal voting rate of 37 percent in sex discrimination cases, well below the Democratic
rate, which is 52 percent.24 But on RRR panels, Republican appointees show a liberal
voting rate of 30 percent, and on DDD panels, Democratic appointees show a liberal
voting rate of 60. The polarized difference of 30 percent is of course double the overall

17
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Id. at 26.
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Id. at 20.
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difference of 15 percent. Differences of this magnitude are typical; they are the rule, not
the exception.25
In numerous areas of federal law, ideological voting, ideological dampening, and
ideological amplification are the basic findings.26 It follows that the political affiliation of
the appointing president is a relatively good predictor of judicial voting in ideologically
contested cases – but that the political affiliation of the president who appointed the other
two judges on the panel is at least a good predictor of judicial voting in such cases! These
findings suggest that the standard figure, for judicial voting behavior, looks roughly like
this:
Figure 1

Liberal Voting Rate

Standard Voting Patterns of Federal Judges
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In a few areas, however, these patterns are not observed. First, ideological voting
cannot be found in certain domains in which it might be expected; for example, there is
no significant difference between Democratic and Republican appointees in criminal
appeals and in cases involving the takings clause, congressional power under the
Commerce Clause, punitive damages, and standing to sue.27 It is possible that existing
doctrine imposes significant discipline on judges in such cases, in such a way as to ensure
that ideological predispositions do not matter to judicial votes. It is also possible that
federal judges do not much disagree, across party lines, in such cases, and hence
ideological voting is not observed.
Second, panel effects cannot be found in cases involving abortion and capital
punishment.28 In those domains, ideological voting is unmistakable, in the sense that the
25

Id. at 26-27.
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Sunstein et al., supra note, at 49.
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Id.
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disparity between Democratic and Republican appointees is substantial. But the votes of
federal judges are unaffected by panel composition. Apparently judicial convictions are
especially strong in this context, and hence neither ideological dampening nor ideological
amplification is observed. How can the absence of those standard findings be explained?
I shall turn to that question in Part III.
Interestingly, and contrary to a reasonable prediction, the extent of the overall
difference between Republican and Democratic appointees does not predict the existence
of panel effects. In abortion cases, the overall difference in liberal voting is 16 percent. In
capital punishment cases, it is 24 percent. The difference in liberal voting rates is even
higher in the domain of affirmative action (28 percent) than in either of these areas, and it
is also high in cases involving the National Environmental Policy Act (24 percent),
abrogation of state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment (21 percent), sex
discrimination (17 percent), and disability discrimination (16 percent).29 But in those four
areas, panel effects are substantial, as both ideological dampening and amplification are
found.30 What matters, then, is not the extent of the difference between the two sets of
appointees, but the tenacity with which they maintain their convictions, and the former
does not predict the latter.
With this background, let us turn to the national security cases.
B. Method
The data set consists of 111 courts of appeals decisions handed down between
September 11, 2001 and September 10, 2008. The data set was generated by searching
databases for a series of national security-related keywords31 and then manually
eliminating cases that turned out to be irrelevant. Cases were excluded if they did not
seriously engage national security issues, if they involved review of immigration or
asylum decisions, or if the federal government was not a party. Because a central goal of
the project is to analyze panel effects, en banc decisions were also excluded. Not
surprisingly, the cases that make up the data set involve highly disparate subjects;
common themes included challenges to detention, to surveillance, or to government
efforts to conceal information.
Judicial votes were categorized in terms of whether they favored the government.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, this measure was simple to apply, but in some
29

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 26-27.
31
The initial search string in Westlaw’s “cta” database was: (FISA "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION"
ATLEAST3(TORTURE) GUANTANAMO "PATRIOT ACT" SY,DI("SEPTEMBER 11" "9/11"
"NATIONAL SECURITY" TERRORISM TERRORIST TORTURE "WAR ON TERROR")
((("NATIONAL SECURITY" & TERROR!) ATLEAST3(TERROR!) ATLEAST3("NATIONAL
SECURITY")) & (FOIA WIRETAP DETAIN! DETENTION SURVEILLANCE "9/11" "SEPTEMBER
11")) & da(aft 9/11/2001) & da(bef 9/14/2008) % ("IMMIGRATION JUDGE" "BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS"))
30
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cases the categorization was not straightforward, because several issues were involved,
and the government won on some of them but lost on others. In such cases, the
government was said to have “won” if the government received most of what it wanted
and lost on a minor or peripheral issue. In these few cases, a discretionary judgment had
to be made on that question. United States v. Moussaoui,32 for example, the coding
decision was not straightforward. The court of appeals ruled that it could order the
government to produce enemy combatant witnesses for depositions, that a particular
witness would be material to the Moussaoui defense, and that the particular deposition
substitute proposed by the government was inadequate. But the court nevertheless
affirmed the government’s central proposal, which was to offer a written substitute
instead of producing the witness. This result was counted as a victory for the government.
Discretionary judgments of this kind were necessary only in a very small subset of the
cases.
By our count, the panel majority found in favor of the government in a total of 94
cases out of a total of 111. As is standard, judges were classified as Democratic or
Republican appointees based on the party affiliation of the president who nominated
them.33
C. Results
Here are the basic results:
Figure 2
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Aggregate Voting Patterns of Federal Judges in
National Security Cases
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The most noteworthy findings are simple to describe.
1. The overall invalidation rate is low – about 15 percent. In terms of expected
outcomes, very few areas of the law have been found to be so lopsided. For example,
criminals win their appeals about one-third of the time,34 punitive damage awards are
invalidated over one-fifth of the time,35 property owners win takings claims about 20
percent of the time,36 and disability plaintiffs win discrimination suits about one-third of
the time.37 Of areas that have been studied, the only one with a more lopsided rate
involves challenges to congressional power under the Commerce Clause, in which the
victory rate is about 5 percent.38
2. It might well be expected that the difference between Republican and
Democratic appointees would be compressed in this domain. The area of national
security might eliminate party differences; no judge would lightly rule that the
government lacks authority to do what it deems necessary to protect the country.
Surprisingly, however, there is no discernible compression. In a large data set, involving
many domains, the average difference between the two sets of appointees was 12 percent;
in ideologically contested cases as a whole, it was 15 percent.39 The difference here is 11
percent, which is statistically significant and very much in line with the overall findings.
It is comparable to the differences in cases involving campaign finance regulation (14

34
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percent), obscenity (9 percent), racial discrimination under Title VII (9 percent), and
desegregation (9 percent).40
To be sure, the 11 percent difference is lower than what is observed at the highest
end of the range of domains studied to date; in cases decided under the National
Environmental Policy Act, there is a 24 percent difference, and in affirmative action
cases, the difference is 24 percent.41 But it cannot be said that Democratic and
Republican appointees behave essentially the same in national security cases. Nor can it
be said that the level of difference, in this domain, is significantly lower than what it is in
most domains in which ideological voting is observed.
3. It might also be expected that national security cases would follow the standard
pattern shown in Figure 1, with rising liberal voting rates as the number of Democratic
appointees increases, reflective of ideological dampening and ideological amplification.
Because the sample size is relatively small, any conclusions on this point must remain
somewhat tentative; but no such pattern is observed. The voting patterns of Democratic
appointees cannot be shown to be associated with panel composition. Such appointees
vote to invalidate government action about one-fifth of the time regardless of whether
they are sitting with zero, one, or two Democratic appointees. In a striking contrast to
other areas of the law, Republican appointees show the same voting patterns on RRD and
RRR panels. To be sure, such appointees seem to show a modest shift in the liberal
direction on RDD panels, but the difference is not statistically significant. The more
general point is that none of the panel effects even approaches statistical significance.
4. We might anticipate that in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, say
between 2002 and 2004, judges would show a high rate of deference to the executive
branch, and that validation rates would decrease from 2006 to 2008. In the aftermath of
the attacks, the threat would be immediate, and courts might well be reluctant to
invalidate government action that was initiated in order to reduce the relevant risks. As
the immediacy of the attacks receded, perhaps judges would come to think that the
danger had been overstated; perhaps they could be more willing to invalidate government
action.
No such pattern is observed. The rate of validation is essentially constant over the
two time periods. The three plots in Figure 3 show the trend in invalidation rates; for
clarity of exposition, they divide the relevant time period in different ways. The first plot
divides the cases into three periods and calculates the rates within each period; the second
gives annual invalidation rates; the third divides the cases into eleven time periods and
calculates the rate within each period.

40
41

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 20.
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Figure 3
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Not surprisingly, the shorter time intervals show more variable invalidation rates,
but the differences are not significant. The general point is that there is no measurable
increase in invalidation rates over the time period studied; if anything, the invalidation
rate actually decreases, but the trend is not statistically significant.
III.

Explanations and Observations

What lessons can be drawn from these findings? How do they compare with other
domains of the law? What might be said about the approach of federal courts of appeals,
after 9/11, to actions of government that are challenged in court?
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A. Invalidation Rates
1. Two conclusions. The invalidation rate seems to suggest two conclusions. First,
federal judges have been showing a high rate of deference to the executive branch.42
Second, the rate of deference is not nearly as high as it might be, or as it might be
expected to be. Judges have not adopted anything like an irrebuttable presumption in
government’s favor. In other words, the existing voting patterns seem to suggest that
federal courts have repudiated both of the polar positions in the academic debate.
2. Selection effects. These conclusions are reasonable and probably even correct,
but we need to be careful with specific inferences. To evaluate the findings, it is
necessary to ask two questions. What exactly is government doing in the relevant cases?
And when are litigants willing to challenge government action? Without answers to these
questions, any evaluations must be tentative.
We could easily imagine a world in which total invalidation rates were
significantly higher – say, 25 percent. But perhaps the higher invalidation rates, in that
world, would be a product not of a more aggressive judiciary, but of greater litigant
selectivity in deciding when to challenge government action. Such selectivity might stem
from multiple sources. Perhaps social pressures are leading people to challenge
government action, in this domain, only when it is clearly unlawful; or perhaps litigants
are highly risk-averse, fearing that adverse rulings could entrench bad law. In short, a
relatively high invalidation rate might reflect the selection of cases for litigation, and
might not tell us that federal courts are not being deferential.
Alternatively, we could imagine a world in which total invalidation rates were
significantly lower than they are now -- say, five percent. But perhaps the lower rates, in
such a world, would be a product of greater litigant willingness to challenge government
action -- and also of greater caution, on the part of government, about testing the legal
frontiers. Perhaps ideological litigants, in such a world, would challenge government
action not only when they had a significant chance of success, but also for political or
expressive reasons; perhaps they would not greatly fear validation. Perhaps government,
in such a world, would stay well within the legal boundaries, fearing the consequences of
invalidation in terms of frustration of its objectives, adverse public reactions, or both. If
so, a low invalidation rate would not suggest a high level of judicial deference.
Which world is closer to ours? Without knowing, we cannot draw clear
inferences about judicial aggressiveness. But it is nonetheless true that the 15 percent
invalidation rate suggests both that courts are not adopting a broad rule of deference and
that they are usually giving the government the benefit of the doubt.
3. No changes over time. As I have suggested, it might be expected that
invalidation rates would increase over time. In the period immediately following the 9/11
42

For an interesting hypothesis about high deference rates from the lower courts, compared to the Supreme
Court, see Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009).
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attacks, we might expect courts to adopt a general rule of deference, perhaps on the
theory that any “balancing” should be tipped in the government’s favor. The salience of
the attacks would seem likely to produce such deference. But as the attacks receded in
time, and as no fresh attack occurred, a somewhat more aggressive posture might be
expected. Alongside the passage of time, signals from the Supreme Court seemed
inconsistent with complete deference.43 For this reason as well, a higher rate of
invalidation should be expected in the more recent period.
The absence of any discernible change over time is a genuine puzzle. We can
imagine four explanations. First, the hypothesis about salience effects might simply be
wrong. It might simply be the case that the judicial posture in 2002 was not different
from the judicial posture in 2007. Second, selection effects might be responsible for the
absence of changes over time. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, litigants might
have been reluctant to challenge government action unless it was clearly unlawful; more
recently, they might be bringing closer cases.
Third, the invalidation rates might mask important qualitative differences.
Perhaps judges have indeed been taking a more aggressive approach, but perhaps their
aggressiveness manifests itself, not in a higher invalidation rate, but in a willingness to
strike down a few especially important programs, which they might have validated a few
years before. Fourth, the absence of a discernible change might reflect the growing
number of Republican (Bush) appointees to the federal courts, which might produce a
shift in favor of the government in national security cases. Because the composition of
the courts is not constant over time, a general decrease in salience effects, and hence
greater judicial willingness to scrutinize government action, might be counteracted by
new appointments to the federal bench.
Unfortunately, the data do not permit us to choose among these four accounts. But
a close reading of the cases does suggest that there are not fundamental differences in the
posture of courts across the various periods; any such differences, if they even exist, are
far more subtle than might be anticipated.
4. A future inquiry (about the past). The study here is limited to national security
cases after 9/11. It would be most valuable to ask the following question: What is the
invalidation rate, in such cases, before 9/11? Suppose that in the relevant period, the
invalidation rate is 40 percent. If so, we might be confident that there has been a “9/11
effect,” in the sense that courts are now far more deferential than they were.
A study of this sort would be quite valuable, and it would cast some light on the
findings here. But it would raise its own puzzles. First, the number of national security
cases, in the decades before 9/11, is relatively small; it would not be simple to obtain a
sufficient large sample to produce helpful comparisons. Second, the national security
cases before 9/11 are hardly the same as the national security cases after 9/11. To put the
point provocatively, a comparison between the two might be a bit like comparing
43
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punitive damages cases with national security cases. The reason is that the issues in the
pre-9/11 era were so fundamentally different from those in the post-9/11 era that to treat
them all as part of a unitary category called “national security cases” is probably
unhelpful. Third, selection effects would confound comparisons. Litigants may well have
different inclinations after 9/11, and hence it would not be easy to offer confident
comparisons of invalidation rates in the different periods.
B. Ideological Voting
1. No compression. A reasonable prediction would be that in the aftermath of the
attacks of 9/11, Democratic and Republican appointees would not be fundamentally
different from one another. The hypothesis would be that the tragic consequences of the
attacks, especially in the first decade after they occurred, would greatly compress
ideological differences. There are at least crude analogies in the past. The Court’s
decision in Brown v. Bd. of Education, for example, led to an apparent consensus
between Republican and Democratic appointees, for a long period, in segregation cases;
between 1945 and 1965, the two sets of appointees agreed with one another.44
Notably, no such compression is observed. Strikingly, the different inclinations of
the two sets of appointees are strong enough to break out even in the aftermath of a
national catastrophe. As we have seen, the 11 percent difference is not massive. But as
we have also seen, it is statistically significant, and it is within the general range of
differences observed in other areas of the law.
2. A future inquiry (about the future) – a party effect?. In all of the relevant cases,
federal judges confronted a Republican administration. Is this relevant? Would different
judicial voting patterns be found if the pertinent measures had been undertaken by a
Democratic administration? A plausible hypothesis would be that judges display an
independent party effect -- in the sense that Republican appointees are more skeptical of
Democratic administrations than of Republican administrations, while Democratic
appointees show the opposite pattern.
In important domains of administrative law, a party effect is indeed demonstrated.
In reviewing interpretations of law by the Environmental Protection Agency and the
National Labor Relations Board, federal judges are especially willing to uphold decision
headed by a president of the same political party as the president who appointed them.45
Consider the following table46:

44

See Sunstein et al., supra note, at 41.
See Miles and Sunstein, Do Federal Judges Makes Regulatory Policy, supra note, at 850.
46
Id.
45
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Table 1
Validation Rates of Court of Appeals Judges
by Party of Appointing and Current President in Chevron Cases
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses, and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Party of Appointing President
(A) Democrat

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
Difference of
(2)
(3)
(2) – (3):
.698
.605
.093*
(.043)
(.035)
(.056)
[116]
[195]

Total
(1)
.640
(.027)
[311]

(B) Republican

.637
(.025)
[369]

.592
(.038)
[169]

.675
(.033)
[200]

–.083*
(.050)

Difference of (A) – (B):

.003
(.037)

.107*
(.058)

–.070
(.048)

—

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10% level, and ** denotes difference significant at 5% level.
Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

It would not be surprising if a similar effect were observed in the domain of
national security. Perhaps Republican appointees would be less deferential to government
intrusions on the domain of liberty, if those intrusions were undertaken by a Democratic
administration. Perhaps Democratic appointees would be more deferential to government
if a Democratic president headed the executive branch. It would be most valuable to see
whether ideological compression would be observed under those circumstances.47
C. Panel Effects
To understand the absence of discernible panel effects, we need to know
something about ideological dampening and ideological amplification.
1. Dampening. What causes ideological dampening? There are several answers. In
some cases, the isolated judge is undoubtedly convinced by his colleagues
notwithstanding a possible disposition to rule the other way. Sitting with two Republican
appointees in an affirmative action case, the Democratic appointee might be persuaded
that under existing law, the program is indefensible. In other cases, ideological
dampening is likely a product of internal dynamics in which the isolated judge accepts
the result in return for some concessions in the analysis. Sitting with two Democratic
appointees in a campaign finance case, the Republican appointee might vote to uphold
the program so long as the opinion is narrow and does not venture far beyond the
particular facts. To this extent, ideological dampening, measured only in terms of votes,
47

For striking evidence of a significant party effect among citizens, see Geoffrey Cohen, Party Over Policy:
The Dominating Impact of Group Influence On Political Beliefs, 85 J Personality and Social Psych 808
(2003).
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probably understates the role of the isolated judge. Even if Rs look like Ds when they sit
on majority D panels, and even if Ds look like Rs when they sit on majority R panels,
they might have succeeded in moving the opinion in their preferred directions.
In still other cases, the isolated judge may privately disagree with the result, but
may conclude that it is not worthwhile to dissent. By hypothesis, a dissenting opinion will
not change the outcome, and its production will take some work and may ruffle some
feathers. It is true that on some occasions, a dissenting opinion might increase the
likelihood of en banc or Supreme Court review, but both of these are relatively rare. For
this reason, a judge might conclude that it is better to join the majority, on the ground that
something is gained and nothing is lost. A form of internal cost-benefit balancing may
argue in favor of the collegial concurrence even if the judge does not, in fact, agree with
the majority’s conclusion.
Finally, many judges appear to follow an informal rule of reciprocity, in
accordance with which they will not always or even ordinarily dissent from opinions with
which they do not agree, in the understanding that other judges will follow the same rule.
The basic norm might well be to accept the majority’s conclusion, at least if the stakes
are not terribly high, with the understanding that this norm is generally held. A rule of
reciprocity would seem to fit well with the internal calculation in the usual run of cases:
A dissenting opinion imposes burdens and by hypothesis is likely to produce no change,
and hence it may makes sense for judges not to dissent despite their private
disagreements.
We might see ideological dampening as a reflection of the more general power of
conformity pressures.48 When people find themselves isolated with a different view from
that of unanimous others, they often tend to yield.49 They do so either because those
views carry information about what is true, or because they do not want to appear wrong
or confused to others.50 The dynamic among federal judges is not at all the same, but it is
overlapping. The evidence suggests that judges are apparently influenced by the views of
their colleagues and they might well be attempting to avoid the disapproval, and
occasional unpleasantness, that can be produced by a dissenting opinion. Note in this
regard that ideological dampening can be found on every federal court of appeals – with
the single exception of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.51
According to informal lore, Republican and Democratic appointees do not get along well
on that circuit,52 and the absence of a norm of reciprocity may be partly cause and partly
effect of that fact.

48

See Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social Animal 13 (Elliott
Aronson ed.) (1995).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Sunstein et al., supra note, at 113.
52
See, for example, the remarks of Judge Gilbert Merritt in
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/09/03/loc_ohcourtplayers03.html
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2. Amplification. At first glance, ideological amplification seems more
mysterious. Two Democratic appointees, on a three-judge panel with one Republican
appointee, should be able to obtain the result they prefer. Why do they show significantly
more moderate patterns on mixed panels than on unified ones?
One explanation points to group polarization. It is well-known that like-minded
people typically end up in a more extreme position in line with their predeliberation
tendencies.53 Perhaps RRR and DDD panels participate in a process of group
polarization, in which judges move one another to more extreme voting patterns. The
standard explanation of group polarization supports this account. On that account, such
polarization is produced by the exchange of information within the relevant group.54 If,
for example, a group of people is discussing climate change, and is antecedently inclined
to believe that it poses serious risks, the pool of arguments favors that antecedent belief.
As those arguments are revealed, people tend to shift. It is easy to imagine a similar
process within a judicial panel, as different arguments, in (say) a case involving disability
discrimination, move people toward more extreme points on unified panels.
An alternative explanation points not toward the relatively extreme behavior of
judges on unified panels, but to the more moderate behavior of judges who constitute a
majority on mixed panels. On this view, that more moderate behavior is what must be
explained. The simplest account would stress a whistleblower effect.55 The presence of a
Republican appointee imposes a discipline on two Democratic appointees, just as the
presence of a Democratic appointees imposes a discipline on two Republican appointees.
Perhaps legally doubtful results are more possible on unified panels than on mixed ones,
because of the absence of a whistleblower on the former. If this is so, that absence helps
to explain the relatively extreme behavior of like-minded judges on unified panels. A
softened version of the whistleblower argument would point not to results that are legally
doubtful in any strong sense, but to the fact that the presence of a minority member may
raise arguments and impose discipline on the majority, producing more moderate voting
patterns.
Note that whatever the explanation for ideological amplification, its actual effects
are likely to be larger than what can be picked up by a quantitative examination of
judicial voting patterns. Opinions matter, not merely votes, and if amplification is
occurring, DDD and RRR panels are likely to show relatively extreme opinions. The
empirical finding of ideological dampening is probably overstated in an important
respect, because it does not speak to opinions, on which the isolated judge likely has an
effect. By contrast, the empirical finding of amplification is probably understated,

53

See Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes
(forthcoming 2009).
54
See Brown, supra note.
55
See Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale LJ 2155 (1998).
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because there is every reason to think that opinions are unusually extreme on unified
panels.
3. No dampening, no amplification. How, then, can the apparent absence of panel
effects be explained in national security cases post-9/11? The best answer is that judicial
judgments are firm – so much so that the views of panel members do not matter. In the
domain of national security, differences between Republican and Democratic appointees
appear to be so strongly held that the views of panel members simply do not matter.
Ideological dampening does not occur for that reason. Compare the only other
domains, to date, in which dampening has been found not to occur: capital punishment
and abortion.56 In those domains, the absence of dampening is not entirely surprising. If
antecedent convictions are deeply held, none of the mechanisms that account for
dampening will be strong enough to move judicial votes. In such areas, judges will not be
convinced by their colleagues. They will be willing to do the work that is necessary to
produce a dissent, perhaps in the hope of attracting Supreme Court attention or
influencing future courts. They will be willing to create the kinds of disruption that might
attend dissenting opinions. Where the stakes are high, the informal norm of reciprocity,
reducing dissenting opinions, is qualified or breaks down. A key finding here the area of
national security falls in the same category as abortion and capital punishment.
I have suggested that amplification occurs either because of group polarization or
because of an absence of a whistleblower effect. But if judges already have quite strong
convictions, then they are not likely to be polarized by internal discussions. And if judges
do not trust those who purport to be whistleblowers, then they are not likely to be moved
by them. These points help to explain why amplification is not observed here.
Conclusion
Some people believe that when national security is threatened, federal judges
should adopt a strong presumption in favor of government action. Other people believe
that when national security is threatened, federal judges need to maintain a strong hand in
order to prevent official overreaching. The evidence suggests that in the aftermath of the
attacks of 9/11, the courts of appeals have rejected both of these polar positions. They
show unusually high deference rates without providing anything like a blank check to the
executive. Notably and somewhat surprisingly, the rate of invalidation has not increased
over time, as vivid memories of the attacks recede.
At the same time, the significant split between Republican and Democratic
appointees demonstrates that ideological differences are playing a large role in this
domain. Indeed, the magnitude of the difference between the two sets of appointees is

56

Sunstein et al., supra note, at 55. Panel effects cannot be demonstrated in the area of gay and lesbian
rights, but because the sample size is so small, the lack of a demonstrated effects is not worth much. The
shape of the figure suggests that both dampening and polarization might be occurring. See id.
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similar to that in numerous other areas of law. Contrary to a plausible hypothesis,
ideological compression is not observed.
Perhaps the most striking finding involves the absence of panel effects. While the
sample size is relatively small, the evidence suggests that judicial views are firmly
entrenched, and hence judicial votes appear unaffected by the views of judicial
colleagues. This is an unusual and noteworthy pattern. Ideological dampening and
ideological amplification are pervasive on the federal courts of appeals, but they cannot
be found in national security cases post-9/11.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Cass R. Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
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